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Strengthening Domestic Corporate Activity in Global Capital Markets:
A Canadian Perspective on South Africa’s Corporate Governance

Draft May 21, 2004
Janis Sarra*

Corporate governance is concerned with the enhancement or
fortification of the rules and principles of company direction for the
purpose of accommodating the modern environment within which
companies operate, and the imposition of stricter checks and balances
to curb or alleviate malpractice or wrongdoing by those engaged in
corporate decision making.
Tshepo Mongalo, Durban, South Africa, 20031

Introduction

South African scholar Tshepo Mongalo has defined corporate governance as a dynamic process
to maximize efficiency and generate wealth, but one grounded in the statutory and common law
history of governance as the process of controlling managers and balancing the interests of all
stakeholders affected by the corporation’s conduct.2 His definition reflects the fact that companies
operate within a regulatory framework that facilitates their wealth generating activities and hence
they have civil obligations to the home and host nations in which they operate. This approach to
corporate governance seems particularly relevant for emerging economies such as those in SubSaharan Africa, where the risk of corporate malfeasance may be higher given the power
imbalance between the host state and the multinational enterprises (MNEs) who engage in

*

Dr. Sarra is Assistant Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. My
thanks to Sarah Jones (Law II) and Danielle Park (Law II) for their assistance in background research for
this paper.
1
Tshepo Mongalo, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, A Global Picture of Business Undertakings
in South Africa, (New Africa Books, Cape Town, 2003).
2
Ibid. at 185, citing Job K Kihumba, Chair, Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust (Kenya) (2000),
“Setting Governance Policies: Codes or Regulation?” (Global Corporate Governance Trust Conference)
Connecticut, 10 July 2000, http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/Kihumba.doc).
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productive activity in their countries. The tension between the need to attract global capital and
the need to address pressing social, economic and environmental issues in emerging economies
frames the governance debate in a direct and poignant way.

As a Canadian corporate law scholar who recently had the opportunity to visit South Africa and
meet with some of its scholars, practitioners and citizens, I was humbled by both the profound
challenges and the immutable positive spirit of the South African people when it comes to thinking
about their economic and social future. Hence while this paper is a reflective discussion on the
kinds of challenges that exist and the strategies that could be deployed to enhance corporate
governance in South Africa, it must be emphasized at the outset that it is for Sub-Saharan African
nations to develop their own governance models. They are best positioned to adopt strategies
that align with their social, economic and political goals, and it is not for the West to impose
Anglo-American conceptions of corporate and securities laws on developing nations. While there
are lessons, both positive and negative, from the North American governance experience, selfdetermination of optimal governance strategies for emerging economies will allow them to take
account of both domestic needs and global capital markets.

This paper is divided into four parts. The first part sets a context for the discussion, including an
overview of the corporate law regime in South Africa and more generally, the challenges faced by
Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic development.

Corporate governance cannot be

discussed without at least some appreciation of the challenges posed by foreign direct
investment, the level of debt of these nations and broader development concerns. Much of the
wealth of Sub-Saharan Africa has been mortgaged previously, creating enormous barriers to
becoming independent in their economic policy choices.

Part II then sets out a framework for

thinking about corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, briefly analyzing both shareholder
wealth maximization and stakeholder models of governance. Part III shifts into a more specific
discussion of corporate governance developments in South Africa. In this respect, South Africa
shares much in common with Canada in terms of its capital structure, corporate law and
challenges of being a host nation for many multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered
elsewhere. The King II Report on corporate governance is examined in terms of its influence on
shaping corporate governance policy in South Africa. A more fulsome conception of corporate
governance for South Africa includes empowerment, equity and the inclusion of African value
systems. Finally, Part IV looks forward, examining the possible benefits and limits of socially
responsible investing through the new Johannesburg Stock Exchange SRI Index. It also briefly
discusses areas of further research that may provide assistance in enhancing domestic corporate
activity in South Africa.
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I.

The Context

A.

South Africa’s Corporate Law Regime

Several statutes govern corporate law in South Africa, the primary statute being the Companies
Act which governs both public and private companies.3 Public companies must have a minimum
of seven members (shareholders), and corporate entities can be members.4 Public companies
must comply with the financial reporting and accounting requirements set out in the Companies
Act, as well as listing requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) where the
company is a listed company. Where the public company is not a wholly owned subsidiary, if the
number of members falls below seven and the members have knowledge of this, the statute
specifies that the members shall be jointly and severally liable for payment of all debts incurred by
the company for the period in which the number of members is below the statutory minimum. 5
The constating document for companies registered under the Companies Act is the memorandum
of association, setting out the capital structure, the process for appointment of directors, specified
duties of directors, and voting rights of members.6 The company is also required to have articles
of association.7 The Companies Act allows for both par and non-par value shares, similar to the
corporations statute in British Columbia, Canada.8
Private companies are limited to a membership of 1-50 members.9 Membership can include both
natural persons as well as corporate entities. The primary difference is that the right to transfer
shares is restricted. The shares cannot be publicly traded, and they are subject to such other
restrictions as specified, such as preemptive rights.10

Private companies must raise capital

privately, failing which the company is treated as a public company.11 Members of a private
company can determine their governance structure in shareholders’ agreements, which are not
public documents. Private companies are held to slightly less rigorous accounting standards.
State-owned enterprises, parastatals, are regulated in a manner similar to public companies.12

3

South Africa Companies Act, 1973, as amended, No. 61 of 1973, 1973 SA Corporate Law 61. See also
the Financial Institutions and Insurance Financial Advisory and Intermediary Service Act, 2002 SA Fin
Inst and Ins 37.
4
Section 32, South Africa Companies Act.
5
Sections 32-73, South Africa Companies Act.
6
Section 52, South Africa Companies Act.
7
Section 59, South Africa Companies Act.
8
Section 74, South Africa Companies Act. British Columbia Business Corporations Act. Until 2004,
British Columbia was also a memorandum jurisdiction in terms of the structure of its corporate laws.
9
Section 20, South Africa Companies Act.
10
Whereas public companies must use “limited” as the end of the company name, private companies must
use the designation “(proprietary) limited”.
11
Section 20, South Africa Companies Act.
12
Naidoo, supra, note 13.
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The governance structure under the South Africa Companies Act resembles the statute’s British
origins. The board of directors is responsible for oversight of the company. The structure and
power of the board is drawn from the company’s articles of association. While the duties of care
and loyalty by directors are not codified in the statute, the duty has been acknowledged at
common law. The Companies Act does contain some specific duties, for example, directors and
officers have a duty to disclose an interest in contracts.13 There is also some codification of
directors’ obligations when a firm is financially distressed, where directors have an obligation to
minimize losses to creditors and may be personally liable for fraudulent or reckless trading.
Section 424 of the Companies Act specifies that in the course of winding-up or judicial
management, if it appears that the business of the company was being carried on recklessly or
with intent to defraud creditors, the court may declare that any person who was knowingly a party
to such actions is personally liable for all or part of the company’s debts. “Reckless” in this
context has been defined by the court as conduct that evinces a lack of genuine concern for the
company’s prosperity, including failure to regularly attend meetings and carrying on business
where in the eyes of a reasonable business person, there was no reasonable prospect of
creditors being paid for the transactions.14

The Companies Act requires a “company secretary” for a public company, with such an
appointment optional for private companies.15 The company secretary is appointed by the board
and has some of the characteristics of the role of “lead director” that is increasingly common in
Canadian corporations. The company secretary is the principal administrative officer of the
company. The secretary is responsible for ensuring that board procedures are regularly reviewed
and followed in practice, and that all legal and regulatory requirements are complied with. The
secretary also works with the board chair and CEO to determine strategic administrative issues;
and provides directors and the board with guidance on the discharge of their responsibilities in
the best interests of the company.16 The role is often filled by the financial director, the auditor
(independent of its audit function) or by professional companies offering this specific service.17

The South Africa Companies Act allows for fundamental changes by special resolution, requiring
21 days clear notice, a quorum being 25% present and voting, and a majority of 75% present and
by proxy required to carry the vote.18 The board of directors approves the Annual Financial
13

Sections 234-237, South Africa Companies Act.
See for example, Ozinsky NO v. Lloyd 1992(3) SA 396 (c).
15
Section 268A-268I, South Africa Companies Act.
16
King II Report on Corporate Governance, published 26 March 2002, at 2.10 (hereafter “King II”).
17
Ramani Naidoo, Corporate Governance, (Cape Town, Double Storey Books, 2002) at 30.
18
Section 199, South Africa Companies Act. For urgent matters, shareholders holding 95% of shares can
agree to abridge the notice period, s. 199(3).
14
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Statements, although they are presented to the annual general meeting for the members’ receipt,
with 21 days notice.19 Members elect the directors and formally appoint the auditor. Members
have remedies under the Companies Act, including: relief from oppression; the ability to seek an
appointment of inspectors to investigate financial interest in and control of the company; the
power to impose some restriction on shares or debentures; and some power of investigation of
the company’s affairs.20 The oppression remedy is similar to that in Canadian statutes. Section
252 of the Companies Act specifies that a member may complain that an act or omission of the
company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being
conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable. The court has broad
powers to remedy the oppression, including making orders for regulating the future conduct of the
company.

The Companies Act also provides the mechanism to allow companies to offer shares publicly.
Chapter VI of the Companies Act sets out requirements for offering of shares and issuing a
prospectus.21 Companies must also comply with the JSE listing requirements, which include a
requirement that companies comply with Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice
(GAAP) as advocated by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants and international
standard setting bodies.

The introduction of the STRATE (share transfers totally electronic)

allows for the administration of share transfers by electronic means.22

The appointment, removal and duties of auditors are regulated under the Companies Act, as well
as other applicable legislation.23 The Companies Act does not require that an audit committee be
struck, although companies listed on the JSE are required to have an audit committee.

The Companies Act also makes provision for a special type of private company which uses
“incorporated” after its name, in which the memorandum and articles specify that the liability of
directors is unlimited in respect of contractual obligations incurred by the company for the period
they are directors.24 Another statute in the South African system is the Close Corporations Act,
which allows for limited liability companies with a maximum of ten members who must be natural
persons.25 This statute has streamlined reporting requirements.
19

Section 302, South Africa Companies Act.
Sections 252-268, South Africa Companies Act.
21
Sections 142-169, South Africa Companies Act.
22
Transactions in STRATE Approved Securities, http://www.jse.co.za/jse_initiatives/strate, last accessed
May 4, 2004. See also Rules of Share Transactions Totally Electronic Limited (STRATE), updated as per
Government Gazette No. 24212, December 20, 2002; Directive SDJ, Rules for the Processing of Corporate
Actions in STRATE, Special Gazette S5-2003, February 13, 2003.
23
Sections 269-283, South Africa Companies Act.
24
This form is frequently used by attorney, auditor and professional firms.
25
Close Corporations Act, 1984 SA Corporate Law 69.
20
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Other legislation also has a direct impact on corporate governance.26

For example, the

Employment Equity Act, 1998 requires that companies above a specified size develop
employment equity plans and undertake regular periodic reporting on progress in achieving the
plan’s objectives.27 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2002, requires that private
companies, including registered close corporations, produce specified operational data.28 The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as environmental legislation, defines
environmental rights of South Africans. Section 24 of the Constitution specifies that everyone has
the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promotion of conservation
and ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable
economic and social development.29 Depending on the outcome of these suits, constitutionally
enshrined environmental protection rights may have a profound impact on corporate governance
standards.

These provisions impose a duty of care on any party that directly or indirectly

contributes to transgression of these rights. Recently, there have been some class action type
suits brought against corporate polluters under these provisions.30 A recent court judgment also
held that companies may not be able to be ISO certified for particular activities where they have,
previously violated standards under environmental legislation.31

These developments may

sufficiently affect a corporation’s ability to engage in economic activity that greater attention is
paid to environmental compliance.

The King I and King II reports on corporate governance have also shaped governance practices
in South Africa, considered at length in Part III.

Aimed at issuing companies, the King II

recommendations offer a comprehensive approach to governance and in 2003, the JSE revised
its listing requirements based on King II’s recommendations.

B.

Recent Governance Failures in South Africa

Notwithstanding comprehensive legislation for the governance of companies, South Africa has
experienced several major governance failures in recent years. In 1999, the holding company of
26

For example, the National Environmental Management Act, No. 107 of 1998; the Insider Trading Act,
No. 135 of 1998; the Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999.
27
Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998.
28
Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 14.
29
Chapter 2, section 24, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
30
Naidoo, supra, note 13; citing as example the Thor Chemicals mercury poisoning case; the asbestos
related claims against Cape plc and anti-pollution suits against Iscor for discharge of toxic effluent into
unlined seepage outs and dams on the outskirts of Vanderbijlpark steel plant, at 7-9.

7
healthcare group Macmed was the largest corporate failure in the history of South Africa, entering
liquidation owing 16 banks R1 billion in unsecured loans.32 There was a serious governance
failure at Macmed. Profitable operations were diverted to expansion of hospitals, with directors
and auditors failing to flag the incredible drain on cash flow of this expansion campaign. Financial
statements failed to fairly disclose the financial status of the company. There were also
allegations of insider trading. The liquidators brought a civil suit against four directors with a claim
of R900 million, which was proceeding in 2004.33 There was also an issue of the former auditors
not reporting the irregularities in Macmed’s financial statements when they were forced to resign
as auditors three years prior to the collapse; reporting that would likely have prevented losses of
millions of Rand.34

In October 2000, the collapse of LeisureNet affected 5,400 full time employees and almost one
million South Africans, many of whom had paid for lifetime or long-term contracts.35 LeisureNet
operated 85 health and racket clubs in South Africa and through its various corporate structures
had 17 subsidiaries throughout Europe and Australia. It was placed under a winding-up order
and a commission of inquiry was appointed to examine the dealings and affairs of corporate
officers.36 At the time of its collapse, LeisureNet had debts totaling R681 million and its previous
financial statements had failed to disclose R900 million in contingent liabilities.37 The two senior
executives had also failed to disclose their interest in companies that LeisureNet had acquired,
where they pocketed gains both from the acquisition and associated management fees. The
officers were charged with fraud and theft and with contravening section 234 of the Companies
Act.38 LeisureNet’s governance failure is particularly significant because it had many governance
mechanisms in place. The audit committee had six chartered accountants on it, however the
board as a whole had left the integrity of the financial reporting to the audit committee, without
engaging in oversight itself.39

This illustrates the need to have the entire board remain

responsible for the integrity of the financial reporting.

A series of legal actions in connection with LeisureNet’s collapse are still working their way
through the court system, including litigation regarding the scope of examination of corporate

31

Ibid. at 134.
One billion Rand. Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 94.
33
Wiseman Khuzwayo, Macmed Civil Case will Begin Next Week, (23 January 2004), Business Report.
34
Chantelle Benjamin, “Auditors turned blind eye to Macmed cover-up”, (08 May 2004).
35
Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 34-35.
36
Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, 2003 (3) BCLR 253 (C) at para. 12.
37
Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 34.
38
Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, supra, note 36.
39
Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 50.
32
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officers when those disclosures may influence criminal proceedings against the officers.40 In the
proceedings to date, the Court has held that there is an inevitable tension between the right to a
fair trial for corporate officers and the public interest in the proper investigation of corporate
collapses. The Court held that a general immunity from use of derivative evidence would furnish
wrongdoers with “immunity baths” contrary to the public interest. The Court found that a balance
is achieved by direct use immunity and by leaving use of any derivative evidence a matter for the
discretion of the trial judge.41

Another example of corporate malfeasance was the collapse of Regal Treasury Bank in June
2001. An inquiry into the collapse of Regal found that the CEO and Board Chair Jeff Levenstein
failed to act in good faith and with integrity in the best interests of the bank. It found that he acted
fraudulently and dishonestly, carried on the business in a reckless manner and that he had
“confused corporate governance with thuggery”.42

The Chair/CEO engaged in self-dealing

transactions, securing excessive cash bonuses, stock options and other benefits. On the day
before the bank was placed under curatorship, he had ordered R22 million of debts owed by him
and his brother in law, Jack Lurie the former Chair, to be paid by the bank.43 Levenstein chaired
5 of the 8 board committees, and he fired staff and removed directors who questioned his actions.
The inquiry also found that the directors of Regal had failed to act diligently and to exercise the
care and skill which is reasonably expected of persons of their expertise; that the directors had
failed to ensure that the audit committee operated in accordance with the Banks Act; and that
they had failed to challenge the Chair and CEO in his decisions.44

The findings of the Regal Treasury Bank Inquiry resonate with the kind of super-egos involved in
the Enron scandal in the United States, where the failure to challenge a powerful corporate actor
meant that the usual oversight and supervisory role of the board was completely ineffectual. The
Regal Inquiry also criticized the company auditors for failing to act in the bank’s best interests.
The inquiry report led to 90 pages of recommended criminal charges, including 18 recommended
counts of fraud against Levenstein and Lurie. The South African Institute of Chartered
Accountants pursued investigations into the chartered accountants of both LeisureNet and Regal

40

Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, supra, note 36. The High Court Cape of Good Hope
Provincial Division held that the purpose of an inquiry under section 417 of the Companies Act was to
assist liquidators in discharging their duties and in their primary objective of ascertaining the assets and
liabilities and recovering the assets and that the problem of the admissibility of derivative evidence was to
be dealt with on a flexible basis by the trial court.
41
Ibid. at 84.
42
J.F. Myburgh, S.C., General Report (Independent review of certain governance aspects of South African
banking sector), 30 April 2003, on file with author, at 19.
43
Naidoo, supra, note 13.
44
Myburgh, supra, note 42.
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Treasury Bank.45 There have also been several other bank failures, notably Saambou Bank
Limited in 2002.46 These failures have resulted in less capital available to smaller South African
businesses.

A further inquiry into the corporate governance aspects of South African banks, named the
Myburgh Commission after its chair John Myburgh, reported in 2003.

The Myburgh Report

advocated substance over form in corporate governance, but it emphasized that banks have an
obligation to comply with the law, balancing economic performance with legal constraints on their
activities. In 1999, the South African Reserve Bank established a Financial Stability Committee.
Part of its mandate is to monitor the capitalization and governance of its domestic banks and
other financial institutions.47

The Nel Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Masterbond Group and Investor Protection in
South Africa made a series of recommendations to enhance confidence in the securities law
system in South Africa.48 It observed that public confidence in the accounting profession has
been shaken, in part because of the failure of the auditing profession to acknowledge its role in
detecting fraud, the perception of loss of independence, and the demise of several companies
shortly after external auditors had signed unqualified audit reports.49 It recommended changes to
regulation of the profession that would protect the quality of the external audit function, including
an independent oversight function to encourage high professional standards.50

There are also challenges for enforcement of corporate and listing standards. For example, the
JSE fined steel producer Iscor for failing to disclose share dealings by its director Lakshmi Mittal
on a timely basis.51 Mittal is director and owner of a company, LNM Group, with 35% interest in
Iscor. The director engaged in self-dealing by purchasing close to R400 million in Iscor shares in
the closed period leading up to announcement of the company’s financial results, without
disclosing this purchase to the board.52 The company, not the director, paid the fine.53 If insider
trading penalties are paid by the company, and as in this case, involve a controlling shareholder

45

SAICA to Probe ‘Errant” Cas, News24.com, http://www.news24.com/News24/Finance/companies, last
accessed January 2004.
46
South African Reserve Bank, Annual Report, 2002 at 7.
47
South African Reserve Bank, Financial Stability Review, March 2004.
48
The Honourable Mr. Justice H.C. Nel, Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Masterbond Group and
Investor Protection in South Africa, Cape Town, April 2001.
49
Ibid. at 328.
50
Ibid. at 343.
51
CFOweb, “JSE fines Iscor R200,000”,
http://m1.mny.co.za/cfcgvn.nsf/0/C2256B5E00442C01C2256C41004BCFBA?OpenDocument.
52
Ibid.
53
Naidoo, supra, note 13.
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who is unlikely to be ousted through the annual general meeting, the system sets up
inappropriate incentives to reduce self-dealing transactions.

These governance failures in South Africa are particularly significant. They illustrate the gap
between governance standards under a comprehensive corporate law regime and compliance
with those standards. A recurring pattern in the collapse of these South African companies is
weak boards that failed to engage in effective oversight of the business and affairs of the
company, and in particular, failed to ensure that senior officers did not engage in self-dealing.
The inability of boards to act independently to discharge their oversight function is the result of
numerous factors. They create what scholar Marleen O’Connor has called “group think”, where
key actors in the corporation create a board culture that rewards unquestioning agreement with
executive decisions and discourages any independent role for directors to question decisions or
actions.54

As with other governance systems, the challenge is how to create a culture of good

governance that is principles-based and at the same time create effective enforcement
mechanisms that act as a deterrent to misconduct and hold directors and officers accountable for
any breach of their fiduciary obligations.

The corporate failures of recent years have led to some reforms of South African corporate and
securities law. The JSE revised its corporate governance listing requirements following the King
II recommendations. The JSE has been creating new avenues to encourage venture capital
investments.55 The JSE has also started to de-list companies that no longer meet the filing
requirements, in order to maintain public confidence in the capital markets.56 As with the colossal
failures in the United States in the past three years, these initiatives raise the question of whether
the corporate law system creates the appropriate incentives for corporate actors in their pursuit of
wealth generating activity, a subject discussed at length in Parts II and III.

C.

Development Potential and Barriers to Effective Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

In thinking about corporate governance in South Africa, part of the context that informs the
discussion is the much broader issue of development in this region of Africa. The economic and
social situation of Sub-Saharan African states is a critical consideration in thinking about domestic

54

Marleen O’Connor, “Enron and the Perils of Group-think”, on file with author.

55

One question is how to support small and mid-market companies in South Africa, in terms of dual challenges of size
and location in a developing country. South Africa continues to need access to capital, particularly in terms of venture
capital. The JSE has reported that it recognizes that the Venture Capital Market (VCM) and the Development Capital
Market (DCM) have not been successful in providing this access and so it has launched a new initiative Altx in a joint
venture with the Department of Trade and Industry. Http://www.jse.co.za.
56

It de-listed 57 companies in 2003, ibid.
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corporate activity and governance challenges in global markets, particularly given the serious
poverty and the economic imbalance in power for these nations as they seek to strengthen
domestic activity. Amartya Sen has suggested that development must be seen in terms of
substantial freedom of people.57

Yet people who are economically, politically and socially

disenfranchised are unlikely to experience this fulsome meaning of development.

i.

The Plight of Developing Nations

The World Development Report 2000 on Human Poverty provides a snap shot into the
challenges.58 78.4% of people in Ghana; 70.2% in Nigeria; 36% in Uganda and 11.5% in South
Africa live on less than US$1 per day.59 The percentages of citizens that are not expected to live
to over 40 years of age are: 21% in Ghana; 33% in Nigeria; 46% in Uganda and 30% in South
Africa.60 Lack of safe drinking water and extremely poor sanitation conditions are major
contributors to the mortality and morbidity rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.61 Even where there has
been a reduction in infant and adult morbidity and mortality, the infrastructure necessary to
support the resulting growth in population, including access to safe drinking water, adequate
health care services, decent education, skills building and jobs has not been put in place. The
HIV/AIDS epidemic is taking a devastating toll on the citizens of Sub-Saharan Africa and the lack
of an effective prophylactic as well as the more general lack of access to health care services is a
serious barrier to development. The pressure on Sub-Saharan African nations to address these
urgent challenges competes with their ability to pay off international loans, creating irregular and
uncertain public policy priorities and growing problems for both aspects of states’ commitments.

Sub-Saharan Africa is facing complex pressures internationally. The shift in the post-colonial era
to global markets is a shift that has a complex impact on different African nations because of their
different size, history, political structure, social and economic base, natural resource base and a
host of factors that make the challenges for each of these nations quite unique. Sub-Saharan
Africa has emerged in recent years from a prolonged period of colonization, in which colonizing
individuals or their descendants directed not only its economic base, but also political traditions
and structure, and a host of other social and economic activities. This unique history, and in
particular, the distribution of property and other economic wealth, informs current capital and
governance structures of corporations.
57

Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom.
World Development Report.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
58
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Sub-Saharan Africa’s debt grew from $84.1 billion in 1980 to $227.1 billion in 1996, representing
three times the value of the region’s exports of goods and services.62 Africa still receives a
disproportionately small share of foreign direct investment as compared with other developing
and transition nations. Foreign direct investment (FDI) usually involves a foreign investor making
a direct equity investment in assets in the host nation, frequently with intent to manage the asset
and with a view to medium to long term investment.

An example would be registering a

subsidiary of a large multi-national enterprise, to undertake activity in the host nation and take
advantage of the limited liability regime to limit any downside risk of operating in the country. Of
FDI flows to emerging markets from 1990-2000, Africa received 4% compared with Asia, which
received ten times that amount.63 Globally, FDI to Africa is only 1%. The principal amount of FDI
in Africa is investment in extractive industries in those countries that are oil and resource
endowed. For example, Nigeria, Lesotho and Angola account for more than 60% of FDI inflow
into Sub-Saharan Africa.64 The G-8 Nations have recently pledged billions of dollars to promote
FDI in Africa, yet FDI continues to be limited.65 Development aid to Africa fell 40% from 1999 to
2001, from $17.2 billion to $12.3 billion.66 The combination of reduced aid and limited FDI has
exacerbated the difficulty these nations face in moving toward economic self-sufficiency.

Many problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are exacerbated by the weak financial sector. In the
search for capital to engage in productive economic activity, the financial system is an important
component because it facilitates the exchange of goods and services, creates capital on a scale
sufficient to meet the needs of the economy and provides markets for the transfer of financial
assets.67 There is a need to have a well-functioning corporate and financial system in place, with
appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, so that foreign investors are attracted to
investment in the region. Currently, the heterogeneity of financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the different stages of secondary market development, and the uneven distribution of currency
and other markets, means that Africa continues to be considered high risk as a investment

61

The World Development Report suggests that more than half of the Nigerian population have no access
to safe drinking water or proper sanitation; the figures for the other countries are equally disturbing. Ibid.
62
Peter Nyikuli, “Unlocking Africa’s Potential: Some Factors Affecting Economic Development and
Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa”, (1999) 30 Law & Policy Int’l Business 623 at 629.
63
Sam Manesh, “African Capital Markets: Developmental Issues and the Challenges of Globalization”, (10
May 2000), presentation to Africa Direct Summit, Toronto, Canada [Manesh is CEO, SEM Financial
Group, Ghana]; Mthuli Ncube, “Financial Regulatory Environment in Africa”;
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/business/1200hearings/panel14statements.htm.
64
Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 5.
65
Rebecca Trent, “Implications for Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa under the Africa
Growth Opportunity Act” (2002) 23 N.W.J. Int’l & Bus 213 at 214.
66
World Bank, Africa Development Indicators Report.
67
Manesh, supra, note 63 at 2.
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strategy.68 While foreign investors must be offered a system that allows for diversification of risk,
Africa needs to encourage long-term investment, in order to raise capital to build more
sustainable infrastructure for corporate and social activity.

Equally important, Sub-Saharan

African countries must devise a financial sector strategy that recognizes the incredible challenges
posed by their status as developing nations, including distributions of wealth that are the result of
long periods of colonization and discrimination. As with corporate law, there will not be a stable
financial sector absent regulatory mechanisms in place that protect property rights; that allow for
monitoring and enforcement; and that allow appeal to judicial bodies that are impartial and
independent where disputes arise between financial market actors. Sub-Saharan African nations
must also develop the infrastructure that will sustain a financial system, and provide skills training
and jobs for those who will become the gatekeepers to the integrity of the system. Trent has
observed that FDI can arguably enable Sub-Saharan African countries to add to capital formation
and increase total savings, which in turn could be directed toward debt reduction and funding of
social programs.69

ii.

The Contested Strategies to Overcome Economic Inequality

While a complete analysis of these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, one must be
cognizant of the connection between effective corporate governance and development concerns.
There is a growing critique of development strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa, with strong
normative disagreement about the appropriate course of action to relieve the poverty and
underdevelopment.70 Any enterprise operating in Africa must take account of serious problems
such as the incidence of HIV/AIDs, issues of access to water and housing, land redistribution
problems, access to education, and access to credit or equity capital in growing businesses.
More than 20% of the workforce in South Africa has AIDS or is HIV positive.71 Naidoo observes
that with the current infection rate, the size and nature of regional markets in South Africa will
change substantially in the near future. South African companies have an extremely low level of
public disclosure on social, health and environmental issues, with only 1% of South Africa’s top
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100 companies producing separate reports on triple bottom line issues.72

One survey on

corporate sustainability reporting ranked South Africa at the very bottom of 19 countries
examined.73

In terms of corporate activity and economic development, some scholars have suggested that the
African managerial and bureaucratic class has been compromised by the direct economic
benefits accruing to it from managers’ support and facilitation of global capital exploitation of
resources, a form of “mal-development” in Africa.74 Hence there is a question about the capacity
of state governments to effectively manage the development process. Structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) formulated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reflect the
interests of global finance as opposed to the African people. SAPs have required Sub-Saharan
African nations to sell state enterprises cheaply, liberalize markets, devalue currency, reduce
budget deficits and cut jobs.75 However, international loans made on condition that the nation
restructures its economy may not appropriately recognize the particular challenges of adopting a
developed country market economy in a developing nation. Some of the normative underpinnings
are not valid because of the education, information and property ownership asymmetries that
exist for the bulk of the population. In some instances, because of the need to attract economic
activity to the region, structural adjustment programs have created opportunities for MNEs to
engage in environmentally harmful activities in relatively unchecked pursuit of profitmaximization.76

A critical issue is whether the current international debt load carried by Sub-Saharan African
nations is a major barrier to economically sustainable development, and in particular, how it acts
to deter domestic corporate activity. The total debt of African countries rose from $6 billion in
1970 to $210.7 billion in 1994, representing 82.8% of Africa’s GDP and 254% of its export
earnings.77 The history of this debt load is complex, and different jurisdictions have different
historical, political and social reasons for the volume, structure and repayment terms of the debt.
There is evidence to suggest that much of the funding never went to development, but rather,
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went to corrupt officials to enhance their own wealth.78 Hence states are required to repay debts
for funds that were never beneficially directed to the country. While this is not unique to Africa,79
it is particularly exacerbated with the other economic, social and political challenges. That these
challenges of corruption extend to jurisdictions beyond Africa raises the question of the
responsibility that the World Bank and other international funds or lending institutions have to
ensure that those who are the beneficiaries pay the debt.

In South Africa, the loans were made to apartheid governments, benefiting a small group of South
Africans. Extremely little was ever directed toward development initiatives and toward
ameliorating the lives of the socially and economically disadvantaged. Today, the South African
government is saddled with onerous repayment terms for benefits that accrued to only a few.
The onerous obligations mean that valuable resources are directed away from developing safe
drinking water, health care facilities, education, and a range of other social and economic
supports and basic infrastructure that is required if South Africa is to become a sustainable
economy. This challenge is even greater in some other Sub-Saharan African countries. The
difficulty with reliance on the World Bank and IMF loans is that the repayment and other
conditions that were previously imposed have saddled current citizens with debt loads and
repayment conditions that are almost impossible to meet.80 Massive international debt repayment
obligations carry with them the inevitable consequence of poverty, famine and spiraling health
care crises. Moreover, the sheer quantum of indebtedness creates a situation in which Africa’s
resources, which are abundant but limited, are being extracted, while only a small proportion of
the wealth generated from this economic activity accrues to the millions of people living in the
Sub-Saharan African countries.

It is estimated that in order for African countries to make a dent in poverty alleviation, they need
to raise annual GDP growth to 7-8% annually, which in turn requires raising investment levels to
25-39%.81 Yet Manesh observes that the capital required for development will not come from
donors or from the banking sector in Africa because it traditionally specializes in lending on a
short-term basis. He suggests that long term capital must be raised through capital markets
specializing in long-term debt financing and equity investment, and that such markets will not
develop absent liquidity which allows long-term investment holders of shares and bonds to sell
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with ease to maintain the appropriate diversity in their files.82

Manesh observes that the

relationship between liquidity of markets and economic growth through savings, investment and
productivity, holds after controlling for other social, political and economic facts that may affect
growth in Africa, such as political stability, inflation, education, fiscal policy, the legal system and
openness to international trade.83 Liquidity in the market can enhance investor confidence;
however, liquidity can also cause uncertainty for the companies that heavily rely on equity
markets because the value of equities traded on secondary exchanges influences the ability of
the company to raise debt financing.

Dr. Peter John Opio has suggested that Africa lags behind in economic development for two
fundamental reasons; that there has been an inability on the part of policy decision makers to
establish a meaningful fit between economic progress, power politics and the common good of
society; and that there is a lack of synergy between political and religious institutions.84 He
suggests that the failure of social market experiments led many African states to quickly embrace
liberal capitalism in the hope of attracting capital from the World Bank and IMF. This form of
capitalism includes freedom of enterprise, the right to private property and a democratic system.
As a result of this shift, Opio observes that the priority of many African leaders shifted from
promoting the well being of the most disadvantaged members of society to concern about credit
ratings internationally.85

Moreover, Opio argues that there is a disconnect between the

assumptions of liberal policies on economic development in Africa and the political, social and
economic experience on the ground.86 He suggests that unless the debt is cancelled, the debt
owed by Africa is likely to soon exceed $300 billion. This will mean that African countries can
never develop or move out of extreme poverty because of the devastating consequence of debt
servicing on society’s poorest and most vulnerable, who service the debt through their taxes.87
Instead, new partnerships between all the economic, political and religious actors should be
viewed as the means forward in development.

Opio suggests that this includes coherence

between the political representations and daily reality, and suspending conditionalities to embrace
the needs of the poor and disenfranchised, giving substantive meaning to respect for human
rights and democratic processes, especially for African women.88
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iii.

FDI and Trade Liberalization: Magic Bullets?

While few would argue that there is not a link between economic development and effective
corporate governance, the nature of that link is highly contested. A number of scholars, primarily
from Anglo-American jurisdictions, suggest that foreign direct investment is the means by which
Sub-Saharan Africa will most rapidly develop.89 For example, the use of robotics and other
advanced technology by General Motors and other MNEs in South Africa has allowed South
Africa to sustain its market dominance within Sub-Saharan Africa.90 Others have observed that
revised foreign aid and debt forgiveness as strategies are not sufficient and that Sub-Saharan
African countries need to become viable participants in global capital markets.91 Bonaglia and
Fukasaku have argued that there is a need for local business plans that improve local conditions
for international business and create a strategy for export diversification.92 For example, the
liberalization of Uganda’s economy resulted in an influx of foreign investment in the late 1990’s
and a growth in GDP to 8% per annum from 1992-1995, although its overall debt continued to
grow due to onerous servicing charges.93

Initiatives outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as the U.S. Africa Growth Opportunity Act are
aimed at increasing foreign investment and enhancing trade relations between the U.S. and
African nations. The statute is aimed at eliminating barriers to free trade, increasing privatization
and gaining market share in the African economy.94 However, Trent observes that one of the first
eligibility requirements is that the host nation agrees to minimize government interference in the
economy through reducing or eliminating measures such as price controls, subsidies and
government ownership of enterprises.95 Hence there is some loss of state regulatory control that
the U.S. is seeking as a prerequisite to providing funding. While the Africa Growth Opportunity
Act may assist in bringing much needed capital to Africa, it is unclear at what price. Foreign
investment does allow capital to flow into Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as contributing to the host
nation some technological, labour skills development, managerial skills sharing and other
advances.96 The control exercised by the foreign investor over the corporate entity means a loss
of economic control by the host nation. This is exacerbated by the loss of regulatory control from
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the up-front conditions imposed on host nations in order that capital flows in.

Host nations

already face severe problems in terms of regulating the activities of MNEs within their jurisdiction,
and the onerous access criteria under the Africa Growth Opportunity Act could exacerbate an
already serious problem.

Access to global markets can be a positive factor.

Domestic corporations can raise capital

effectively, allowing expansion of their wealth generating activities. Investors get the upside value
of wealth generated through dividends, and jobs and other economic benefits accrue to the
community. However, the control issue remains unresolved. Domestic corporations face a loss
of control because of dependence on global capital markets, or they are replaced in the market
by subsidiaries that are registered in the host nation as a separate entity, but have the
competitive advantage of having economies of scale and market access through large MNEs.
Moreover, the capital flows out from productive activity may be highly problematic for future
economic sustainability of the Sub-Saharan African nation, with the risk that any upside benefits
from the activity accrue only to foreign investors. This creates a cycle in which poverty, serious
health issues and environmental protection are not addressed, in addition to weakening domestic
corporations and hence the potential for further economic development.

As Sub-Saharan African nations have moved, at least in principle, towards more mixed-market
economies, they have embraced a number of Anglo-American strategies including price
deregulation, privatization, freer international trade, and a dismantling of state enterprises and
civil services. While these strategies are contested in developed countries, it is evident that they
have been adopted or imposed in Africa without a closer consideration of whether or not they are
development enhancing. Moreover, there is inadequate attention paid to the difference between
development and self-sustainability. Development that is externally controlled may allow MNEs
to extract excessive rents. Combined with co-operation or inability of host nations to secure any
better bargain, benefits that should be directed to economic sustainability can exit the nation in
the form of dividends to investors or in debt repayment.

Trade liberalization and aid tied to it can negatively affect development efforts. In Ghana, Opio
has observed that the emphasis on cocoa production has exacerbated regional and local income
disparities, with 18% of the farming sector receiving 46% of government funding support,
resulting in a declining ability for food self-sufficiency in the nation.97 Liberalization policies and
exchange rate adjustments resulted in farmers of food crops being hit by cheap imports of rice

96

See Modern Africa Growth Fund, New Africa Fund, AIG Africa Infrastructure Fund, Ghana Joint
Venture Fund.
97
Opio, supra, note 77 at 7.

19
and other cash crops, making local farmers extremely vulnerable to private sector food
monopolies.98

There is the further element of the complex political structure and history of Sub-Saharan Africa,
with the result that these countries continue to be labeled as high risk for investment. This
increases the cost of capital, in turn directly affecting the potential for self-sustaining
development.

A number of countries have made incredible advances in their democratic

processes in the past decade, yet there is continued political and social strife. This uncertainty
may bear directly on the development of models of corporate governance that will ultimately
assist in generating wealth for the nation state.

iv.

Sustainable Economic Development

Finally, a core issue for corporate governance is sustainability and in particular, the intersection
between resource extraction, environmental protection and long-term economic sustainability.
This is particularly critical in countries like South Africa, in which resource extraction is a main
source of wealth creation and jobs.

There are increasing environmental problems in Sub-

Saharan Africa due to growing population and the pressures created by population shifts from
rural to urban areas in search of jobs. There is need to ameliorate agricultural and other land use
conditions due to extreme weather conditions, erosion of land, dilution of nutrients from the land
and creation of further non-agricultural land through changing ecological conditions.

These

challenges are exacerbated with the shift to cash crop economies and the draining of wetlands by
commercial agricultural enterprises.

While long term sustainability of agricultural land is an

urgent priority, the lack of energy alternatives and limited land supply have policy makers making
difficult choices between feeding hungry populations and concern about long-term environmental
sustainability. There is also a lack of empirical research regarding the very diverse types of
environmental challenges in regions that encompass deserts to tropical rain forests.

While

developed nations also face the issue of long-term environmental sustainability with difficult public
policy choices, the consequences of these choices are multiplied in nations where the
population’s immediate basic needs for food and shelter are not being met, as exist in many parts
of Sub-Saharan Africa. Often, Sub-Saharan host nations do not have the political will to prevent
further environmental harms because of the economic activity brought to the region by the
activities of an MNE. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002
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concluded that the earth is held in trust for future generations.99 Yet there is not yet a systemic
strategy for coming to grips with the sustainability challenges cited above.

These development challenges inform the corporate governance debate in Sub-Saharan Africa.
What is the proper role of the corporation where host nations do not have the regulatory structure
to require the corporation to engage in economic activity in a manner that reduces harms and
increases the economic security of the people who are working to generate wealth for the
company? What limits can or should be placed on the corporation and what is the appropriate
vehicle for effective imposition and enforcement of any limits?

What is the obligation of

international lending agencies in assisting with the development of governance models that
promote economic and social sustainability?

II.

A Framework for Thinking about Corporate Governance in South Africa

Conceptually, most if not all jurisdictions have legally constructed the corporation as a separate
legal personality aimed at the generation of wealth through its economic activities, with perpetual
existence, the ability to contract and limited liability for investors.

While viewed as largely

engaged in private activity, the corporation, whether closely or widely held, private or an issuing
corporation, is the beneficiary of a highly codified regime that enables it to operate in multiple
jurisdictions.100 There is also special status granted the persons who participate in its activity
through the corporate form in terms of the limitation of individual liability for corporate actors when
corporate activity causes harms.101 Yet globally, there is strong normative disagreement as to the
role and responsibility of the corporation, ranging from a single shareholder-wealth-maximizing
objective that is the predominant paradigm of Anglo-American systems, to conception of the
corporation as socially situated and constructed, more prevalent in continental Europe and Japan.
In parts of Africa, this conception is overlaid with the notion of the corporation’s civic duties.
Corporate law scholarship is grounded in different normative views of the corporation, which form
the underpinning of current analysis. For example, some believe that corporate law involves
observations about the effects of legislative intervention on the functioning of perfect markets,
corrected for any outliers.102

Investors are viewed as rational actors, not socially situated

individuals, with wealth maximization as their sole objective. Hence corporate law scholarship
explores the law’s role as enabling and efficiency enhancing measured by returns to
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shareholders, with all the attendant distributive effects. Yet the shareholder wealth maximization
model appears incongruent with South Africa’s commitment to situating the corporation within civil
society.103 Even Adam Smith recognized that the pursuit of profit could work against the public
interest of wealth generation for the benefit of society and argued for scrupulous examination of
any business legislative initiative that could be contrary to the public interest.104 This observation
appears somewhat lost in the current Anglo-American governance debate.

A.

Corporate Governance in a Domestic Context

Corporate governance, whether in Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada or elsewhere, involves creating
the proper incentives for individuals in their management of the corporation, although the entire
construct of this governance regime depends on what the incentives are aimed at. The
vulnerability of the corporation’s assets to claims from legal liability serves as a constraint on
decision-making by corporate managers, even under the strictest shareholder wealth
maximization conception. If directors and officers subject the corporation’s assets to legal liability
through reckless or negligent acts, they may face personal liability for breach of their fiduciary
duty. However, corporate affairs in a multi-national operation can be arranged so that this risk is
greatly reduced. The combination of the limited liability of the corporate form, and the general
understanding of international law as inapplicable to MNEs’ operations dramatically reduce the
constraints on their managers in regard to respecting the environment, human, political or social
rights in their operations outside the “home” country.105

Corporate law statutes assign directors oversight and control of the operations of the corporation.
Shareholders can exercise episodic voice in corporate affairs, but only indirectly, through the
election of directors, advisory shareholder resolutions, voting on management’s resolutions and
super-majority votes on changes to capital structure that affect the existing shareholders. In
terms of the limited liability regime, a key feature is that shareholder liability is limited to the
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shareholder’s total investment. Managers control the corporation’s activity, but they have no
general personal liability for harms caused by its activity.106 How we construct the economic
incentives in the corporate governance system determines the outcomes, in this case, a
narrowing of the corporate focus to short-term wealth maximization.

The second broad approach to corporate governance is that in acting in the best interest of the
corporation, directors and officers should take account of the interests of all those with
investments or interest in the corporation. While scholars differ on whether this should be a direct
fiduciary obligation to corporate stakeholders or an obligation to balance multiple interests or
prejudice, the idea is to take account of these interests.107 In taking into account stakeholder
interests, the corporation should be concerned with negative externalities from its activities,
including those that cause social and economic harms. This approach is also helpful in that it
seeks to internalize all costs of productive activity, including long term sustainability costs,
adjustment costs for labour shedding and harms from consumer torts.108 The premise is that if
these costs were internalized, the corporation would be more likely to engage in decisions that
foster long term job skills development instead of labour shedding; human rights practices instead
of harms caused by discrimination; and environmentally sound practices to avoid the costs of
harm and remediation that would be internalized to the corporation. The approach also has its
challenges, one of which is how to ensure that corporate decision makers are accountable, given
that they could justify any decision based on an expressed concern for the interests of a particular
group. While the stakeholder conception of the corporation would formally recognize all those
with an interest in the corporation, it leaves unresolved the larger issue of whether or not
corporations should be allowed to determine social and economic policy through their activities.109
Of course, in the absence of any regulatory activity in a particular policy area, corporations are
determining social and economic policy in that area through their unregulated activities.

Corporations engage in wealth generating activity because of public laws and policies that act as
enabling devices in this activity. Yet corporations also have the ability to contribute to political
parties and hence to influence the political process regarding not only corporate law, but also
other laws that touch on their liabilities, such as labour or environmental law.110 Some of the
current challenges to sovereign nations and protection of domestic human rights and
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environmental norms are the result of political lobbying and consequent domestic adoption of
policies of free trade, deregulation and dismantling of particular social safety nets.111 This trend is
repeated internationally as MNEs exert considerable pressure in the international forum in terms
of promoting trade, finance and capital markets policies that insulate their activities outside of the
home state from liability.

B.

Corporate Governance in the Context of Globalization and MNEs

Globalization poses particular challenges to the ability of domestic governments to enforce
specific normative standards, particularly where corporations headquartered in the nation state
have their economic activity elsewhere. It is increasingly evident that domestic law is incapable in
itself of controlling the activities of MNEs, a concern where exportation of particular production
activities creates harms in terms of human rights, health and safety or environmental standards.
Moreover, the ability of domestic jurisdictions to tax corporations to generate revenue necessary
to provide social services to ameliorate the harms is limited by the multinational nature of the
corporate activity.112

What will be the long term impact of “regulatory chill” in terms of both the willingness of MNEs to
situate themselves in jurisdictions with few environmental or labour standards and the inability of
host or home nations to devise laws that protect their citizens from the harmful effects of
unregulated environmentally harmful or discriminatory activity?113 MNEs have been implicated in
nations that engage in repressive human rights policies or police repression in order to engage in
productive activity.114 MNEs have allegedly engaged in human rights violations, activities harmful
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to the environment, child labour, anti-unionization activity, slavery and dangerous health and
safety conditions.115 This has occurred in parts of Africa and elsewhere, particularly where the
host nation is desperate for the economic activity that MNEs offer.

Unlike developed countries, where there exists a framework for tempering the unchecked
activities of corporations through employment standards, human rights and environmental law,
many Sub-Saharan African countries do not have the infrastructure to develop or enforce laws to
address the multinational enterprise.

Moreover, initiatives such as the OECD corporate

governance guidelines are aimed primarily at creating legal and enforcement structures in these
nations for equity capital investors.116 Corporate codes of conduct are aimed at ensuring
transparency of governance and financial reporting, and securities and credit enforcement
regimes offer effective remedies for investors. The convergence pressure in respect of these
property protections is facilitated by the importation of U.S. experts in the design of systems and
considerable pressure to have transition and developing nations adopt Anglo-American norms
and legal structures without consideration of the other types of remedial protections that exist as
a counterbalance in Anglo-American jurisdictions. While these property protections are essential
to fostering investor confidence and thus healthy capital markets, they ignore the need for a host
of other public policy measures that are needed to provide the appropriate balance in wealth
creation and protection of those with interests in the corporation. That interest might be a direct
one, in terms of investments made in labour or local infrastructure, or it may be an interest in the
environmental and social impact of corporate activities on the local community and the
environment. The OECD corporate governance guidelines advocate respecting domestic law
commitments to other stakeholder interests, but are silent on these issues where the domestic
jurisdiction does not already have a developed notion of the corporation as socially situated.117
The growth of MNE activity across multiple jurisdictions and international trade law that facilitates
free trade and limits use of principles such as the national treatment principle has diminished the
domestic regulatory capability of the nation-state, raising troubling social and distributional
issues.118 It is important to examine the specifics of the regulatory diminution.

MNEs are organizations which, while created in one state, operate in several states through
subsidiary corporate entities created in each country of operation, through contractual links in
supply and delivery chains, and/or through licensing and franchise agreements.

As private

entities, MNEs are subject to the national law of the states in which they operate, and may also
have been granted certain rights under treaties between states, rights that can be enforced in the
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courts of the applicable state. Certain treaties also provide for protection of investor rights against
state action through binding international arbitration. Arbitration provides a dispute resolution
mechanism for claims against the state by investors claiming the state regulatory or legislative
actions harmed their investments. Thus a forum exists for private actors to hold public state
actors accountable for decisions that harm equity investments. In contrast, however, there is no
international forum in which these enterprises can be held accountable for their actions in breach
of fundamental international law and conventions concerning human rights, the environment and
social/political rights.119 International law assigns this function to the courts of the various states,
exercising their national jurisdiction over activities of the corporations that originate in or affect
their territory.

There are two issues that arise when subsidiaries are involved. The first is that a subsidiary is
provided with its own “legal personality”. Thus if a subsidiary is created to mine asbestos in South
Africa, then that is the legal entity to which liability will attach in the first instance. If asbestos
mining causes harm, then nothing automatically attaches liability on to the parent corporation for
the acts of the subsidiary, irrespective of the ownership structure. Given this situation, the
incentive on the parent is to leave as few assets in the subsidiary as possible.120 This leaves the
miners with the unenviable task of establishing direct liability through a claim the parent failed to
properly supervise the subsidiary or vicarious liability for the acts of one’s subsidiary.121 Thus,
parent corporations may be encouraged to transfer all of the subsidiaries’ surplus assets to
themselves in order to limit the loss to the MNE overall. If they are successful in doing so, they
will have lessened constraints on decisions to breach international norms.

Second, the use of unlimited subsidiaries as the vehicle for corporate activities internationally
means that directors and officers of controlling parent corporations are not directly liable for the
actions of the subsidiary even where they are the controlling mind of the subsidiary. The
construction of domestic liability regimes, judicial reluctance to draw aside the corporate veil and
the practice of shifting corporate assets from the subsidiary to the parent to shield the assets from
remedial claims in the host nation, create considerable barriers to MNE accountability for
international activities.122

There is frequently reluctance of home and/or host governments to take action against MNEs
because of their importance to the country’s economy or because, as discussed on Part I, they
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are beneficiaries of the company’s activities.

Hence while a separate legal entity has been

formed for purposes of economic activity in the host nation, the host nation may be reluctant to
enact legislation that may protect its citizens during the subsidiary’s value generating activity in
the host nation. Those who may be harmed by its activities frequently do not have access to
standards within their own nation or an enforcement mechanism in order to redress or prevent
harms.123
The beneficiaries of these trends are the MNEs. The liberalization of labour markets has meant
that in the home state, the MNE can exert consideration economic pressure to dismantle
standards and make the home nation “more competitive” in a market in which the MNE has
generated the competition. Failure to accede to these demands results in plant and industry
closures and exportation of the economic activity elsewhere, where the host nation is so anxious
for jobs and economic activity that it undertakes to allow the corporation to operate relatively
unfettered. This undermines the effective power of nations to regulate domestic labour law and
social policy.124 This trend is complicated enormously by the development history discussed in
Part I and by the consequent inability of the host nation that has agreed to trade liberalization to
provide some balance to stakeholder interests engaged in corporate value generating activity.

C.

International Norms versus Corporate “Cultural Sensitivity”

Another issue is what corporations have called the political and cultural sensitivities of the host
nation. An example would be nations where women or particular racial groups are not given
access to employment, or if they are, their compensation reflects highly discriminatory practices.
Respecting the cultural norms of the host jurisdiction in such a case runs contrary to international
human rights and is offensive to Canadian and other law regarding equality rights. The MNE’s
continued investment in the host nation that supports inequitable employment practices results in
further dollars being invested to perpetuate gender and race discrimination. While developed
nations must be careful not to press for wholesale importation of their normative conceptions of
human rights or environmental sustainability into Sub-Saharan Africa and other emerging
economies, it is appropriate to hold those nations to international norms set through democratic
international efforts. The socio-cultural differences cannot be used, as they are now, to justify
discriminatory and repressive labour practices and unaccountable environmental harms.
International NGO communities have identified this problem for years, yet corporations continue
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to engage in global activity, relatively unchecked and unscathed by these debates.125 Hence the
question is whether there ought to be internally generated norms that could potentially
complement the public policy debates of international comparative law scholars.

Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of a rich diversity of complex economic, social and political
situations, hence there is not one prescription or strategy for effective corporate governance nor
should there be. Similarly, while the current challenges facing these countries are shaped by
their history, post-colonial economic controls, the politics of international developments such as
the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and the complex social, religious, tribal structure, there
are commonalties.126

This includes long-periods in their development of external control, first

through colonization, in which many domestic customs and economic activity were suppressed,
and then through continued economic control, through both heavy interest on debt and through
ownership structures of economic entreprises. This history and continued distribution of capital
shapes not only corporate activity, but can determine state attitudes towards corporate
governance.

In turn, this can shape the nation’s prospects for economic sustainability, in terms

of access to education, business and other skills, health care and the infrastructure that can lead
to development. While there will be continued convergence pressure if emerging economies are
to attract global capital, government initiatives must clarify the constraints that the emerging
nation is willing to impose on corporate actors and determine in whose interest regulatory and
economic activity is generated.

D.

Importing Assumptions is Dangerous

In the Anglo-American conception of corporate activity, wealth is generated in part by the creation
of externalities, those costs that the corporation does not have to bear and which are picked up
by society in the form of unemployment, social welfare benefits and health care costs. The
corporation is rewarded for its creation of externalities because it can shed many real costs
associated with its activities and report greater profits, in turn paying out greater dividends to
shareholders and extracting increased personal compensation for officers. Absent a requirement
to account for all costs of corporate activity, the cycle continually repeats itself, causing a further
distribution of wealth in favour of the corporation and its investors.
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In Africa, these externalized costs are borne by millions of poor workers who act as a source of
extremely cheap labour extracting already inexpensive resources. The African people thus lose
both control over their natural resources and over any wealth they may generate, including the
ability to ensure that the resources are preserved, sustained and regenerated for the future. They
also bear the costs from this exploitation through the social and economic costs of poor wages,
an inability to properly feed or shelter families, and injury and death on the job. The framework of
wealth generation by reliance on externalizing costs imported into Sub-Saharan Africa carries
with it some inappropriate assumptions.

One glaring example of the outcome of corporate

externalities in Sub-Saharan Africa are the townships and other conditions of extreme poverty for
those who migrate to urban centres looking for work. These conditions are created by the MNEs
ability to extract concessions in exchange for FDI, resulting in reduced taxes to pay for
infrastructure and the availability of cheap labour in resource extraction. Such an approach does
not allow communities to sustain themselves. While MNEs interesting in investing in Africa now
should not have to bear the full costs of historical inequities, arguably neither should the host
nation or its citizens who are disadvantaged by historical debt repayment obligations. Until one
can break the pattern that currently exists, corporate governance reform in Sub-Saharan Africa
will have little impact.

Amartya Sen has observed that business is both a competitive and a co-operative activity, and
that societies flourish because of codes of conduct and the recognition of strategic
interdependencies, involving the practical recognition of the goals of others, of the enterprise and
of living in a situation of social interdependence.127 Hence, costs and benefits of development in
Sub-Saharan Africa need to be assessed through a process of collective evaluation on the social
value of corporate activity. This requires a determination of to whom the benefits of development
are accruing and who is bearing the costs.128

Equally important, how can one construct a

governance system that addresses the current inequitable distribution of wealth and creates the
basis for more collective benefits that can accrue from successful corporate activity?

III.

South Africa: Strategies for Enhancing Governance

South Africa has fared better economically than many other Sub-Saharan African Nations. Of
global emerging equity portfolios, South Africa has captured about 8%, largely because of the
stability of its Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).129
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capitalization of R170,252 million, with 668 companies listed, and a market capitalization to GDP
ratio of 131.9%.130

Some of governance challenges faced by South African domestic markets bear a striking
resemblance to issues faced by other markets globally. These include: executive compensation
that is not appropriately tied to performance and is frequently excessive; a structure and role of
the board of directors that leads to failure of oversight; the lack of independence of auditors and
problems with transparency and adequacy of accounting standards; and questions about the
appropriate role of outside directors in governance of the corporation. These challenges are
evident in the recent failures of South African companies, discussed in Part I. Yet South Africa
also faces unique challenges in thinking about the advancement of domestic corporate activity
through effective governance.

Much of South African corporate law is based on the U.K. system, including its company law
statutes and much of its common law. Hence governance issues, including the scope of decision
making by corporate officers, prohibitions on self-dealing and the scope and limits of fiduciary
obligation are heavily influenced by U.K. jurisprudence that has developed over the last century.
In this respect, South Africa is similar to Canada, in that Canada’s company law is derived from
the same sources. More recently, American corporate common law has impacted on Canada,
but similarities still exist.

As discussed in Part I, in South Africa longstanding companies’

legislation and other statutes, as well as the common law, were supplemented by a Code of
Corporate Practices and Conduct in the 1990’s.

Yet unlike the U.K. and Canada, the

comprehensive corporate law regime is not matched by remedial legislation that tempers
corporate activity by protecting human rights and enforcing environmental protection. Where
such legislation does exist in South Africa, it is unclear that it is effectively enforced such that it
tempers corporate malfeasance. Moreover, for the reasons cited in the last Part, the host nation
may be unwilling or unable to enforce any remedial protections or standards because of the
urgent need for capital and economic activity in a region.

There are also similarities in the capital structures of South Africa and Canada. South African
companies are primarily financed by equity capital.

Domestic corporations are large and

constitute a sizable proportion of the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa.131 Unlike the U.S.,
in which the operating governance paradigm is one of separation of ownership and control,
Canada’s governance regime is one in which both publicly traded and privately held corporations
are frequently closely controlled. Whereas the primary governance challenge for the U.S. system
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is to reduce agency costs of managerial self-dealing or shirking to the detriment of the interests of
investors, the governance challenge in Canada is to reduce the possibility of collusion between
corporate officers and controlling shareholders (represented also on the board of directors
through nominee positions) to the detriment of minority investors and other stakeholders. While
there has been a large growth in holdings by institutional shareholders in the past decade, there
are still a large number of corporations that are closely held, even when publicly traded, as is the
case in South Africa.

In this respect, the governance challenges facing South Africa are

somewhat akin to those faced in Canada.

The capital structure of South African domestic corporations arose as a result of the sanctions of
the apartheid era and its devastating economic and social inequities.132

A few individuals,

families and companies controlled many of the corporations in a series of complex crossholdings. Apartheid also resulted in relatively little foreign investment or ownership, particularly
as world condemnation of apartheid practices grew.

With the end to apartheid and economic

boycotts of South Africa, the capital markets began to open to the West, creating some shift in
holdings. By 2000, there were 608 companies listed on the main board of the JSE and two-thirds
of all listed companies had a shareholder with more than 30% shareholding.133

While this

indicates a continuing high level of concentration of capital, it also indicates that the majority of
South African companies no longer have legal control vested in a single shareholder. However,
the levels of concentration may mean that these individuals or companies still have de facto
control over governance of the corporation. Mongalo also observes that of 190 corporations
listed on the JSE in December 2001 that had a single or small group of shareholders with 50%
control, the majority were institutional shareholders.134 Hence, he argues that South African
corporate governance must take account of situations in which corporations are widely held, as
well as those cases in which they are closely held, if it is to be meaningful in the South African
context. In this, he believes that the King II report on corporate governance, discussed below,
only considered the governance mechanisms required for widely held corporations in its
promulgation of a revised code of corporate practices and governance.

A.
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Corporate governance in South Africa has focused primarily on listed companies. Governance
policy has been shaped by two reports of Committees studying corporate governance in 1994
and 2002.

The corporate governance principles enunciated by these reports are aimed at

“affected companies”, a defined term.135 The first committee that studied corporate governance
in South Africa was established in 1992, following closely on the heels of the Cadbury Committee
Study in the U.K..136 Dubbed “King I” after its chair, Mervyn King S.C., the King Committee
issued a report and a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in 1994. The JSE subsequently
enshrined many of the recommendations as part of its listing requirements.137 A further review
was conducted a decade later, resulting in the King II Report in 2002, including a revised Code of
Corporate Practices and Conduct.138 While the Code applies to all companies listed on the JSE,
banks, financial and insurance entities, and certain public sector enterprises, King II urged other
companies to give consideration to implementing the provisions of the code as best governance
practice.139 As with many corporate governance codes globally, the King II Code mandates
principles, but does not prescribe a particular course of conduct or action. King II reflects very
sophisticated thinking about the governance role of the board and implications for multiple
stakeholders. In some respects, it is ahead of guidelines developed in many developed countries.
This part examines the substance of recommendations for good governance and then the
challenges for implementation.

The King II Report found that South Africa might arguably offer investment returns that are
competitive globally, even when factoring in political, currency and other risks, and that corporate
governance was an essential component if South Africa is to continue to compete. It referred to
the June 2000 survey published by McKinsey & Co., which found that of 200 global institutional
investors representing US $3 trillion in assets, 84% indicated a willingness to pay a premium on
investment in well-governed companies over those poorly governed (where they had a
comparable financial record).140 Hence, King II’s Code is aimed a providing a comprehensive set
of principles for effective governance.
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King II sets out seven characteristics of good corporate governance.141 The first is transparency,
the ease with which investors and others are able to meaningfully assess the financial and
operational aspects of the company. The second is independence in terms of the mechanisms in
place to ensure the avoidance of conflicts and minimizing potential conflicts of interest. The third
principle is accountability by corporate decision makers for their decisions and actions. King II
recommended that effective mechanisms must exist to allow investors to query and assess the
actions of the board.

The fourth principle is that the board must act in a manner that is

accountable to the company, but also act responsively to and with responsibility towards all
stakeholders.142 The fifth factor is one of corporate discipline; whereby corporate officers adhere
to standards of behaviour that are widely viewed as correct and proper behaviour.143 Sixth, is
fairness, in that governance systems and practices must take into account and balance the
interests of all those with an interest in the corporation and its future. This principle is more
progressive than principles enunciated by many developed countries, although as discussed
below, its implementation faces considerable challenges. Finally, a well-managed company must
be aware of and respond to social issues, placing priority on ethical standards of conduct. King II
observed that good governance means that the company is non-discriminatory, non-exploitative,
and responsible in respect of human rights and environmental protection.

i.

Transparency

King II observed that a report by one institutional investor ranked South Africa among the top five
of 25 emerging markets in terms of corporate governance, but that it ranked poorly in terms of
disclosure and transparency.144

King II observed that the minimalist approach to corporate

governance by a number of domestic companies must change.

King II recommends a number of measures to increase transparency of corporate decisions. It
emphasized that directors must have unrestricted access to all company information, records and
documents, and that the information needs of the board should be well defined and regularly
monitored.145 There should also be transparency in the recruitment and nomination process for
directors. Procedures for appointments should be formal and transparent, and final decisions on
recruitment of directors made by the board as a whole, with the assistance of a nomination
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committee where appropriate.146 The nominating committee should be comprised entirely of nonexecutive directors. King II also recommends that companies provide full disclosure of director
remuneration on an individual basis and that compensation should include performance-related
elements. King II also recommends that membership of the remuneration committee must be
disclosed in the annual report and that the chair of such committee should attend annual general
meetings to respond to questions by shareholders.147

This would enhance transparency by

enabling investors to assess director remuneration and whether it is sufficiently linked to
performance.

The King II report had an immediate impact. The JSE reviewed its listing requirements and
incorporated more rigorous requirements, effective November 2002, for directors in respect of
their dealings in company shares and disclosure of director remuneration in the company’s
financial statements. The revised listing requirements also require the nomination committee of
public companies to be comprised of only of non-executive directors.

Disclosure must also encompass reporting that is broader than financial performance reporting.
King II recommended that every company should report at least annually on the nature and
extent of its social, transformation, ethical, safety, health and environmental management policies
and practices.148

Disclosure of such information should be governed by the principles of

reliability, relevance, clarity, comparability, timeliness and verifiability with reference to the Global
Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines on economic, environmental and social
performance.149 King II also recommends disclosure as to efforts to reduce workplace accidents
and injury; the nature and extent of strategies to address and manage the impact of HIV/AIDS;
best environmental practices; disclosure of human capital development against equity targets.

These recommendations are directly relevant to South Africa’s potential for sustainability. In
many developed countries, there are no similar required disclosures, although a number of
corporations have voluntarily agreed to report on a triple bottom line basis. The difficulty for
South Africa, as for voluntary initiatives in Canada, is that absent enforceable standards, there
may not be sufficient incentive to comply with sustainability goals. Canadian corporations, even
those supporting GRI reporting, have vigorously opposed any codification of standards that would
provide rights and remedies. South Africa may not fare any better once it tries to move past
general principles. Still, the requirement to report on these initiatives is a giant step forward and
likely to have some positive impact on corporate activity, creating some normative pressure
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internationally for a “sustainability culture”. Moreover, reporting and failure to address harms may
encourage NGOs and citizen groups to press for standards and measures to address harms.

ii.

Directors’ Duties

The South Africa Companies Act does not codify the fiduciary obligations of directors, however, at
common law, directors have been found to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company.
Fiduciary duty is not well defined, and the courts have held that principles of equity underlie
fiduciary obligation and that the substance of the relationship and not the form must be examined
to ascertain its nature and extent.150

The Nel Commission investigating the collapse of

Masterbond Group recommended that the duties of directors be codified in the Companies Act,
requiring directors to act honestly and in good faith, with such reasonable skill, diligence and
care, including reasonable inquiry, as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances, in the best interests of the company.151

King II emphasized that directors’ obligations are to the company, not its shareholders.

It

expressly rejects the “shareholder dominant theory”, finding that the company is a separate
persona in law and that the relationship of the company and shareholders is contractual, arising
out of the articles of association.
152

“owners” of the corporation.

It expressly rejected the notion that shareholders are the

However, it also recognized that shareholders expect return on

their investment and that this contractual relationship must be respected. This approach leaves
some uncertainty as to how directors are to exercise their fiduciary obligations and how they may
be held accountable. Express rejection of the “shareholder dominance theory” in favour of best
interests of the corporate is a very positive aspect of the King II Report. Yet absent either
statutory standards of conduct under company law and accompanying remedial statutes, and
effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of those standards, the only accountability
mechanism is a reversion back to shareholder limited control mechanisms of exit and replacing
directors at annual general meetings. King II leaves this critically important question unanswered.

Notwithstanding this unresolved issue, King II contains many important substantive governance
recommendations.

King II found that directors have an obligation to ensure that there are

effective systems of internal control on accounting practices and standards, supported by
reasonable, prudent and consistent judgment.
150
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should have skills, experience and credibility to bring independent judgment to bear on issues of
strategy, performance, resources, transformation, diversity and employment equity and standards
of conduct and evaluation of performance.153 King II called for an affirmation by directors that
they accept responsibility for the preparation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP.
Nomination committees should carefully check to ensure that potential nominees are qualified to
be director, within the meaning of JSE guidelines. King II expressly calls for training for new
directors with no or limited board experience.

This should include a formal orientation

programme to familiarize the director with the company’s operations, senior managers and the
business environment. Such training is also essential to make directors appreciate the scope of
their fiduciary obligations and the potential for personal liability where these obligations are not
fulfilled.

As with many countries, there has been a problem with excessive executive compensation in
South Africa, and insufficient connection between performance and compensation.154

Both

director and officer compensation should be tied to performance, but in a manner that rewards
long term sustainable development, not short term returns. The transparency measures
discussed above may create some normative pressure on corporate boards for their decisions
relating to executive compensation.

iii.

Board Composition and Independence

A survey of 73 major South African companies in 2002 found that corporate boards ranged from 5
to 30 directors, with the average board size being 12 directors.155 For South African banks, the
average board size is 19 directors.156 The size of the board and the independence of directors
can have a direct bearing on effective governance.

The revised Code adopted by the JSE after King II emphasizes that corporations need an
effective board as the focal point of the corporate governance system. The corporate board must
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retain full and effective control over the company and monitor management in its implementation
of board strategies.157 The board has an obligation to ensure that the company has complied
with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business practice, and that it communicates with
shareholders and other stakeholders in a timely and transparent manner.158

King II also

reinforces the notion that the board has a responsibility to engage in strategic planning and risk
assessment for the company. In Canada, risk assessment includes both upside and downside
risks to the company, an idea that is echoed in King II’s suggestion that the board should be
monitoring key performance indicators, with particular attention to technology and systems. The
King II report goes further than Canadian governance recommendations, however, in the sense
of recommending that it is important that boards identify and monitor the non-financial aspects
relevant to the business of the company.159

King II calls for a balance between executive and non-executive directors, preferring that a
majority of directors be independent of management. Its focus here is protection of minority
investors.160 King II also advocates that boards analyze their existing composition to determine
whether their size, diversity and demographic composition ensure that they are as effective as
possible. The revised Code also required a separation of the board chair and the CEO, in order
to ensure a balance of power and authority.

The chairperson should preferably be an

161

independent non-executive directive.

King II expanded on the discussion of independence from its first report. King II defines directors
as executive, non-executive, independent and shadow directors.162

Executive directors are

corporate officers involved in operating the business or in full-time employment of the company or
its subsidiary. Non-executive directors are not involved in daily management of the business, but
can be interested in the sense of being officers of the holding company. Independent directors
are both non-executive and have no other relationship with the company other than the
directorship. The independent director is not a shareholder nominee, does not have familial ties,
is not a professional advisor to the company, has no significant contractual relationship with the
company and is free from any business or other relationship that could be seen to materially
affect the director’s capacity to act in an independent manner.163

A “shadow” director is

considered to be a person (frequently a controlling shareholder) who is able to influence the
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activities of the corporation and decisions of the board, and whose directions or instructions
determine the company’s decisions and actions. King II recommended that shadow directors
should be discouraged.164

King II also recommends staggered terms for boards, formal briefings on developments in the
law, and levels of remuneration that are sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors.165 It
called for regular board meetings, efficient and timely methods for informing and briefing
members, and full access by directors to management.

There should be regular review of

processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of the company’s internal systems of
control.166 King II advocated retention of the single board structure as appropriate to South
Africa, primarily so that all directors would have the same information and hence engage in better
decision making.

King II emphasized that the board’s role is one of oversight, its guidelines closely aligning with the
non-mandatory guidelines developed in Canada. Governance in both countries suggests that the
board must give strategic direction to the company, must appoint the CEO, ensure that an
effective succession planning strategy is in place, and that there is a mechanism to evaluate the
performance of both board chair and the CEO. King II also recommends that companies adopt a
charter setting out board responsibilities, and that the charter should be disclosed in the
company’s annual report. Boards must develop codes of conduct addressing conflicts of interest.
It also recommends that boards define levels of materiality, in terms of defining what powers are
for the board to retain and what is more appropriately delegated to officers, with the board
monitoring the exercise of that power.

The Myburgh Commission investigating governance of South African banks echoed many of
these recommendations. It recommended that banks have smaller boards, that there be limits on
the number of executive directors, and that the majority of directors should be independent
directors.167 It observed that the independence of directors must be de facto as well as de jure,
so that the director can bring impartiality, objectivity, fairness and flexibility to the exercise of
judgment, and have the courage to challenge management’s current or projected future plans
where they consider them not to be in the company’s best interests.168 Myburgh suggested that
non-executive directors should meet at least twice annually without the executives.169 In South
Africa, there are express regulations on the competency levels required of bank directors, aimed
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at ensuring that directors have effective risk management skills.170 As with King II, the Myburgh
Commission adopted a fulsome approach to directors’ duties, that they must have the necessary
skill and experience to engage in oversight of strategy, resources, transformation, diversity and
employment equity, standards of conduct and evaluation of performance.171 There should be
clearly defined authority and roles for all board committees, including ongoing review of their
mandate and effectiveness. The performance of both the board as a whole and the directors
individually should be reviewed at least annually.

King II specifies that the Board should regularly review processes and procedures to ensure the
effectiveness of its internal control systems, in order that both the accuracy of financial reporting
and its decision-making capability are maintained.

There should also be an established

procedure whereby directors can seek independent professional advice, if necessary, at the
company’s expense. The board should meet regularly, at least quarterly, and there should be
annual disclosure of the frequency of meetings and directors’ attendance in the Annual Report.
The Annual Report should also include a statement that the directors accept responsibility to
prepare the financial statements and that they fairly present the state of affairs of the company;
that the auditors are responsible for reporting on the financial statements; that adequate
accounting records have been maintained and that there is an effective system of internal control
and risk management; that appropriate accounting policies have consistently been used and that
any departure is disclosed, explained and quantified. Directors should also attest that there is no
reason to believe the business will not be a going concern in the year ahead, or provide an
explanation of any reasons otherwise. The Annual Report should also disclose which directors
are executive, non-executive and independent, so that investors and others can assess genuine
independence. Finally, the Annual Report should confirm that the Code of Corporate Practices
and Conduct has been adhered to, and report any instances where it has not.

King II also advocates a higher level of shareholder activism and suggests that the board has a
role to play in encouraging investors to be actively engaged, through annual shareholder
meetings, fulsome explanation of proposals and open and effective communication with
investors. Interestingly, this is a departure from much of the Anglo-American approach, in which
investor activism is discouraged; the view being that shareholders can exit if dissatisfied with the
general direction of the corporation.172
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Successful implementation of all these board practices would seriously reduce the incidence of
corporate failures in South Africa. As noted in Part I, almost all the recent failures involved a
weak and non-independent board as a contributing factor to the collapse. Strong, independent
and dynamic boards are a critical component of corporate governance.

iv.

Auditing and Accounting

Another aspect of recent corporate failures has been problems with a critical gatekeeping
function, the internal and external audit processes. The corporate board is accountable for risk
management and effective systems of internal control, including ongoing processes for
identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks.173 Companies should have an effective
internal audit function that provides independent, objective assurance that the management
processes are adequate to identify and monitor significant risks; provide confirmation of the
effective operation of internal controls; credible processes for feedback on risk management; and
objective confirmation that the board is receiving reliable and accurate information.174 King II
recommends a separate audit committee that has a majority of independent non-executive
directors with the majority being financially literate.175 An independent non-executive director who
is not board chair should chair the audit committee. The audit committee should have a written
terms of reference for membership, duties and authority.

The focus on audit independence and financial reporting arises in part out of several corporate
scandals in South Africa that are resonant with scandals in developed countries.

The

Masterbond Group financial collapse highlighted problems of corporate dishonesty and investor
vulnerability. The Nel Commission investigating Masterbond Group and its affiliated companies
found that inefficiency, lack of professional honesty, integrity and independence of corporate
auditors resulting in staggering investor losses.176

The Commission found that accounting

policies had been altered to change losses to profits without disclosure of the changes; that there
was falsifying of financial statements, backdating of auditor reports and other malpractice. More
than 90% of money borrowed on short term was used within associated companies for highly
speculative projects, degenerating into a Ponzi scheme.177 The Masterbond scandal occurred in
173
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the mid-1990’s. At the time, its occurrence was in part attributed to the fact that South Africa did
not have as strong a governance climate as the United States. In the pre-Enron and WorldCom
era, developed countries expressed some arrogance at their superior governance systems.
Ultimately, the U.S. governance system revealed the same kinds of audit and accounting
deficiencies, exacerbated by inappropriate incentives for corporate officers.

The Nel

Commission’s investigation into the Masterbond Group revealed serious deficiencies in the South
African supervisory system and those sections of the Companies Act that were designed to
protect investors. It found that the rights granted the investors were more illusory than real.178

Auditors and accountants are financial gatekeepers, particularly in respect of the accountability of
issuing corporations. South Africa introduced draft legislation on the accountancy profession, to
enhance standards of auditing and accounting and to establish a Representative Council of
Accountants, a Regulatory Board for Auditors and an independent standard-setting board for
ethics.179 However, the Nel Commission reported that the draft legislation had failed to deal with
the need for independent regulation, failed to address increasing public distrust in the auditing
profession by the public and observe that the draft legislation amounted to no more than window
dressing.180

The Commission also recommended that significant interest groups should be

allowed to appoint an auditor, including debenture holders, employees and their trade unions. It
found that the debenture holders and bond investors in the failed Masterbond case would not
have lost millions had an auditor acting on their behalf been able to access the audit files of the
main auditor of the entity.181

A Ministerial Panel on Review of the Draft Legislation on the accountancy profession reported in
September 2003.182 It recommended that the legislation require that auditors comprise only a
minority of members on the board of the regulatory body controlling the profession. It found that
the disciplinary arm of the regulatory body was a particular concern and recommended that a
retired Judge or senior counsel chair it and that the legislation should provide for the enhanced
investigatory powers. The Panel also recommended that auditors should be statutorily obligated
to report to the regulatory body any false representations or material non-disclosures by
executive management, and the regulatory body should be empowered to disclose such
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information to relevant parties if it considers it in the public interest.183 However, the Panel
rejected the notion of statutorily limiting non-audit services as proposed in the draft legislation.
Rather, it would leave the nature and extent of such services to pre-approval of the audit
committee.184 The Panel also rejected the idea of mandatory rotation of auditors, concluding that
international experience indicates that this does not achieve the objective of independence and
that there is no empirical data to suggest that a lengthy auditor/client relationship necessarily
leads to compromise of independence. This recommendation goes in the opposite direction of
current audit and accounting reform in the U.S., although such restrictions have not yet been
imposed on Canadian auditors on the theory that Canada has a principles-based accounting
system as opposed to the U.S. rules-based system that has caused such serious failures. The
Panel also cited the limited skills and resource base in South Africa as not making such rotation
practicable.185 It called for enhanced sanctions for negligent auditors.186 Significantly, the Panel
recommended that the requirement of the audit committee be enshrined in legislation and that the
membership be restricted to independent non-executive directors.187

B.

King II and the Stakeholder Debate

As discussed in Part II, although there are numerous conceptions of corporate governance, the
two principal approaches are the shareholder wealth maximization model and the stakeholder
model. The first seeks to maximize either short term or long term investor returns, and while
long-term investment return can frequently align with broader social and economic goals of a
country, directors and officers are ultimately accountable only to shareholders. The stakeholder
model also enjoys a range of approaches, from corporate directors and officers having to
consider the interests of multiple stakeholders such as creditors, employees and consumers in
acting in the best interests of the corporation, to a more direct fiduciary obligation to the
stakeholders for their decisions and actions.

The King I Report in 1994 advocated an integrated approach to good governance in the interests
of a wide range of stakeholders, having regard for the principles of good financial, social, ethical
and environmental practices. It concluded that companies can no longer act independently from
183
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the societies in which they operate. However, the King II Report softens this approach. King II
makes a distinction between accountability, where one is called on to render an account, and
responsibility, where one is liable to be called to account. King II specifies:

The stakeholder concept of being accountable to all legitimate stakeholders
must be rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to
everyone would result in their being accountable to no one.

The modern

approach is for a board to identify the company’s stakeholders, including its
shareowners, and to agree on policies as to how the relationship with those
stakeholders should be advanced and maintained in the interests of the
company.188

Hence King II expressly rejects having corporate directors be accountable to all stakeholders on
the premise that they would then be accountable to no one.189 The difficulty with this conclusion
is that King II offers no accountability alternative, leaving shareholder remedies as the default
accountability mechanism.

Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that even under the shareholder

wealth maximization model, corporate officers are accountable to a multiple investors with
different investment priorities, timelines and risk capacity, and this has not posed a problem for
determining the scope of fiduciary obligations to act to maximize their collective interests.

Even though King II enshrined some principles regarding sustainability and integrated
sustainability reporting, the governance objectives, including sustainability, appear to be aimed at
maximizing shareholder wealth. It is here that incoherence in various aspects of King II arise.
King II emphasized that entrepreneurship and enterprise are what drive emerging economies,
and hence the challenge for governance is to seek the appropriate balance between enterprise
performance and constraints on corporate activity.190 The mechanism of who will be able to hold
corporate officers accountable to this standard is unclear.

However, even with the softening of its position on stakeholder accountability, it is this set of
recommendations that may distinguish South African corporate governance from that of the
Anglo-American approach. King II recommended a move to triple-bottom line reporting, in which
companies disclose not only their financial performance, but their performance on social, health,
ethical and environmental practices. It recommended that the board of directors should define its
stakeholder groups and direct its governance and reporting to meet their concerns. Stakeholders
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are defined broadly to include workers, trade unions, consumers, suppliers and the community.
King II also recommended that companies should engage their stakeholders in determining the
company’s standards of ethical behaviour, and then demonstrate their commitment by codifying
their ethics. There should also be transparency in disclosure of compliance with the code of
ethics, measured against defined criteria that would include a statement by the board as to the
extent that directors believe the ethical standards are being met.

It also recommended

consideration of transformation challenges such as development of human capital and black
economic empowerment. King II’s revised Code also specifies that the board should ensure that
it receives relevant non-financial information going beyond the financial performance of the
company, and should look at other qualitative performance factors that involve broader
stakeholder interests.191 These measures, if fully engaged, would advance corporate governance
well beyond Anglo-American norms and truly situate the company in civil society. However, the
enforcement mechanisms need to be clarified if the measures are to be truly effective.

One of the stakeholder interests identified by King II is diversity in employment, particularly for
women and black people. In South Africa there has been considerable gender and race
discrimination, with black women historically doubly disadvantaged.

The South African

Employment Equity Act has enabled some black people to gain access to jobs, but it has not yet
been effective on a broad basis.192 Employment equity is aimed at rectifying the social and
economic effects of historical discrimination that acted as barriers to millions accessing particular
occupations. Enforcement of this kind of remedial legislation is a critical component of effective
governance.

While black empowerment has created a class of successful individuals from previously
disadvantaged communities, it has not addressed in any meaningful way the vast majority of
black people in South Africa.193 As a result, there needs to be a more fulsome strategy for
achieving basic economic and social security, and corporations that are extracting considerable
wealth from the country should play a role in advancing these changes. King II recommended
that black economic empowerment should be aimed at redressing the continued unequal
distribution of ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic
resources by ensuring broader participation in the formal economy.194

The King II Report

observed that this is the only viable strategy for making sustained inroads in alleviating poverty
and illiteracy.
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In respect of corporate governance, employment equity has resulted in a slightly increased
number of black men on corporate boards, although the number of women continues to be very
small. The King II Report recommended that companies proactively create the conditions and
opportunities that will allow previously disadvantaged individuals equal opportunity to reach
executive levels in companies. In order to facilitate access, including for women, King II
recommended structural initiatives that will create real access. Scholar Lynne Dallas has written
extensively on the need for Board diversity as an effective corporate governance mechanism,
bringing diverse inputs into decision making and acting as a bridge between the board and the
community.195

Mongalo has observed that the King II report is modelled after international governance models
aimed at reducing agency costs arising due to the separation of ownership and control, hence its
focus on the role of non-executive directors, audit committees and the role of shareholders in
holding managers accountable for their decision making.196 He observes that monitoring the
conduct of directors and officers has become a critical issue in South Africa because of the
importance of companies to the economic and social well being of the country.197 Hence, he
suggests that it is inconceivable to ignore the manner in which companies are governed and the
legal and other control on managerial power. In this, the stakeholder debate becomes a critical
factor.

C. Including African Value Systems in Governance Strategies

King II emphasized the need to create a governance system that recognizes the African value
system. That system emphasizes the collective good over individual realization.198 It recognizes
principles of mutual interdependence and the inclination towards consensus rather than
dissension. Co-existence with others is highly valued and ubuntu, the spirit of humanity, is key.
The essence of ubuntu is that you can be respected only because of your cordial co-existence
with others.199 King II noted that this is a value system that has an inherent trust and belief in the
fairness of human beings.

Finally, one must recognize the hierarchical nature of political

structure and philosophy in South Africa, yet one based on a system of broad consultation and
consideration of interests at all levels as “practiced by the chiefs since time immemorial”.200 King
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II observed that this should form the basis of modern labour relations and people management
practice. Finally, King II observed that the perpetual optimism in South Africa is due to strong
belief in the existence of an omniscient presence. Given this value system, King II defines
corporate governance as leadership that will allow companies to compete effectively in the global
economy and create jobs; that will act honesty and with integrity; that will address legitimate
social concerns relating to the company’s activities and provide leadership that is transparent and
accountable.201

Opio has observed that there is an Africa phenomenology of work, life and relationships,
suggesting that African business requires more that the minimalist profit-maximization business
ethic of the West.202 He observes that the Western approach divorces the business enterprise
from the human person in his or her context. Rather, a business paradigm in Africa must achieve
a dynamic balance between the integrity of business, which includes efficiency, and
competitiveness, and integrity in business.203 In his view, competitiveness also needs a broader
definition, one that encompasses freedom, fairness and equal opportunities for all; strategic vision
concerning the nature of both local and global markets; and a commitment to the needs of society
at large.204 Opio observes that while many of the business scandals in Africa mirror practices in
the West, a challenge is that much fraud in Africa is viewed as normal and perhaps even
necessary compensation for the expansion of the free-enterprise system.205 He observes that
these practices, such as fraud in the banking and telecommunications sectors in Nigeria are
sanctioned by a quasi-legal system of managers.206 Moreover, because of the strong traditions of
family, tribe and community, African managers may place the interests of family members or
tribes people before that of the enterprise, regardless of their skills or suitability. The African
sense of time, where time is a composition of events, and means that there is a danger in the lack
of balance between the procedure of project planning and the execution of the plan.207 Hence,
Opio argues for a vision of business and ethics that integrates business imperatives with human
values, those of life, physical and mental health, happiness, the community and the
environment.208
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Opio argues that economic development in Africa must be built on values of caring, in order to
narrow the unjust gap between the few rich and the large number of poor people who live in subhuman conditions.209 He suggests that Africa will not ever be economically sustainable until
African leaders break from their dependence on financial aid and development policies designed
elsewhere, rather, Africa development must have its own unique set of values.210 Resources are
bridges rather than ends in themselves and hence an African vision of economic relations
includes pro-existing, sharing resources, viewing possessions in the context of relationship and
the faith of human interconnection that allows people to give abundantly from what very little they
possess.211 While he notes that Africa cannot act in isolation and must respond to competitive
global markets, it needs enough distance to develop policies to promote the values of the people,
and only then will it de-colonize itself. Opio argues that current U.S. versions of partnership are
premised on opportunity windows for U.S. companies and as long as that is the only focus, there
is no opportunity for partnership, growth and meaningful cooperation.212 Opio suggests that the
partnership that development agencies need in Africa must be based on the following factors: a
real shift in attitude; respect for humanity; that African nations should not acquiesce in the
monetary benefits they receive from donour agencies; being explicit and respecting each others’
values; “allies on different terrain” with the same objectives; transparency of interest so that
common ground can be found where interests diverge; clear contractual standards; and equality
of capacity.

For the Canadian observer, this Afro-centric approach to corporate governance is very different
than the Anglo-American system that recognizes or rewards few of these values. Investors and
creditors are viewed as self-interested actors and models of governance are designed to temper
the inevitable self-dealing or shirking that arises from this self-interest.

African notions of

collective good over self-realization could alter drastically the way in which corporate activity is
conducted and its success measured. Given the incredible challenges of population growth,
poverty and health issues, the notion of co-existence encapsulated by ubuntu, may present the
only realistic way of developing in South Africa. Yet for all the reasons discussed above, the
counter pressures of global capital and the imbalance in power and wealth may fail to
acknowledge this unique paradigm for thinking about governance.
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IV

Looking Forward

The generation of wealth through corporate activity must take account of whether or not it
advances the social, political and economic welfare of South African people. In determining the
scope and reach of corporate activity, what appropriately belongs to citizens and their state and
what decision making power accrues to the MNE by virtue of its size?

Can domestically

registered corporations compete globally, if they do not conform to the largely Anglo-American
single profit motive conception of the corporation? Is there a happy median or is accumulation of
wealth incompatible with social justice?

There has been some debate as to whether the King II report provides strong enough
recommendations and hence creates the appropriate deterrent effect to corporate misconduct.
The South African Department of Trade and Industry has questioned the voluntary compliance
nature of the Report and whether effective governance measures will be implemented and
sustained absent some statutory enforcement mechanism.213 Naidoo has observed that new
companies legislation, aimed to be in place in 2006, is likely to contain harsher penalties for
governance transgressions.214 She observes that while one of the recommendations in King II
was that a register should be kept of directors who have been found guilty of corporate
governance transgressions, to be in place by mid-2004; that unless a register is linked to an
absolute legal prohibition on directors to act again as directors, it is likely to be ineffectual in
reducing such behaviour.215

The King II recommendations on reporting annually on the ethical, social, health, safety and
environmental practices are important, but unlikely to be effective absent serious commitment to
this by legislators. This may require a commitment that is greater that reporting. A requirement
that the company meet either its own declared goals or specified standards set by the democratic
process, which would give real meaning to sustainability objectives. To date, legislators have not
had the political will to link the corporation’s ability to extract resources and hence wealth to a
requirement to achieve black empowerment, gender equality and environmental and economic
sustainability.
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Even where companies settle actions for harms caused by their activities, there appear to be
inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Naidoo uses as an example the harms caused by
asbestos by mining enterprise Cape plc.216 Under South African legislation, Cape was liable for
rehabilitation costs of land contaminated by its operations. This liability was eliminated by the
Government in exchange for the company paying millions to the 7,500 former employees and
people living in the vicinity of its operation for asbestos-related illness. The government had
concluded that its priority was compensation for those harmed and that remediation would likely
have caused the bankruptcy of the company.

However, Cape failed to make the first

compensation payments and in 2002, the applicants had to pursue legal action to get the
company to pay.
217

process.

Those harmed continue to die as the litigation moves through the legal

Hence while settlements can reduce litigation costs and direct resources to those

harmed by corporate occupational and environmental harm, they will be ineffectual absent
mechanisms to ensure speedy compliance,

Capital is unlikely to flow into South Africa in greater amounts in the absence of effective
measures to stem business corruption.218 The South African government has been working with
the United Nations on elimination of all forms of corruption, including business corruption.219 A UN
Report found that 63% of South African business believes that corruption has become a serious
issue in business, although only 12% stated that they had refrained from making a major
investment because of corruption.220 While the Report concluded that South Africa has a
comprehensive and practical legislative framework in place with appropriate whistle blower
protection, there are serious weaknesses in the capacity and will to enforce the legislation.221 The
OECD has argued that bribery undermines good governance and its development of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (adopted in the U.S. in 1999) will allow companies to be prosecuted for bribery in
both the home and host nations.222

Corporate governance in South Africa and all of Sub-Saharan Africa must engage social,
environmental and economic issues. It must tackle the incredible environmental and ecological
challenges as a high priority. It must directly engage and begin to eradicate the extreme poverty
216
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and poor living standards of the vast majority of people. Development of resources must look to
how it sustains and improves the lives of those in the country, and where this conflicts with the
priorities of those exporting the value generated, there may be need for a new paradigm in terms
of defining rights to profits generated by the resources and people of this region. While flight of
capital is always the risk when considering a reconception of the role of companies, investors will
respond if they receive transparency and certainty in terms of their investments and understand
the real costs of particular economic activity.

One proposed solution is socially responsible

investing.

A.

Socially Responsible Investing in South Africa

In 2004, the JSE launched the Socially Responsible Investment Index (SRI Index), following suit
to the Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index and the FTSE4Good index.223 The JSE launched the
SRI Index as a means of identifying those companies listed on the JSE that integrate principles of
SRI and sustainability into their business activities.224 The Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index
outperformed its regular world index 15.8% compared with 12.5% from 1997-2002, and JSE has
followed suit in an effort to simultaneously capture part of the market and to facilitate investment
in such companies.225 The JSE has publicly committed to rewarding companies for conducting
business in a socially responsible way, and the SRI Index will measure performance of
companies in relation to the triple bottom line. This includes fostering improved stakeholder
relations, promoting the Financial Services Charter, commitment to ethical and good corporate
governance practices, and ongoing focus on safety, health and environmental issues.226 Prior to
this initiative, the amount invested in SRIs in South Africa has been roughly 1.5% of total assets
under management, compared with 13% in the United States.227

Companies listed on the JSE SRI Index must report on environmental, economic and social
sustainability.228 This includes strategies to measure and monitor environmental impacts and the
implementation of systems that ensure that resources are used in a sustainable manner.
Economic sustainability objectives include decision-making that balances short term profits with
strategies aimed at long-term growth. Social sustainability is a recognition that companies are
required to develop and maintain positive relationships with a wide set of stakeholders, not only
223
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shareholders.229

The JSE specifies that “companies need to demonstrate core business

strategies that are linked to internal management systems and key performance indicators aimed
at promoting the social upliftment, development and poverty reduction of its staff and the
communities in which it operates”.230

This includes a focus on employment equity, black

empowerment, fair labour practices, employee health and safety, development of human capital
and managing the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the companies activities.231 The Plan is
to measure policy and strategy, management systems and performance and quality of reporting,
having regard to standards set by internationally, such as the Global Reporting Initiative
Sustainability Guidelines, 2002; the UN Declaration of Human Rights; the UN Global Compact,
1999; the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES); Social Accountability
8000, 2001 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).232

The Social Venture Network has advocated principles of corporate social responsibility, including:
ethical dealing with stakeholders; transparency and accountability to stakeholders; governance
that seeks to balance conscientious management of resources with the interests of stakeholders;
the objective of long-term growth and shareholder value; employment practices that support
diversity, empowerment, fair labour practices, and a harassment free and family friendly work
environment; fair and honest business dealings and quality products; an open, honest and
transparent relationship with the community and environmental protection.233

With the launch of the JSE SRI Index, there may be synergies in creating long-term shareholder
wealth maximization and engaging in socially responsible behaviour, as the latter may produce
value for shareholders in the long term from reduced liabilities, better consumer goodwill and
fewer environmental remediation costs. SRI funds utilize particular social and economic
benchmarks as signs of effective governance. In some cases, they have policy analysts sitting
on the trading floor with the financial experts, making decisions on ethical investments against
criteria of environmental compliance, compliance with labour, employment and human rights
standards and local securities law, as measures of effective stewardship of corporations and
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hence long term value maximization potential.234 In the U.S. alone, it is estimated that SRI funds
hold $2 trillion in assets.235 Those advocating SRI and its ethical screening view SRI as the
primary vehicle through which to achieve corporate social responsibility, by ultimately positively
influencing stock prices. The premise is that shareholders will simultaneously profit and through
their investments promote social objectives, the notion of doing well financially by “doing social
good”. These are important developments, because they link effective stewardship of the
corporation with norms such as long-term sustainability and human rights that arguably can be
broadly supported as norms that we as a society want to support. It also indicates that there is a
market for SRI funds, in terms of investor preferences. There are, however, a number of critiques
regarding the efficacy of SRI. There are problems of transparency in terms of the information
base on which these decisions are being made and different conceptions of what it means to be
in compliance with such norms.236

Scholars have also challenged the notion that SRI means that investors will “do well by doing
good”. Knoll tracks SRI to turn of the century Quaker and other Christian initiatives screening
investment for “sin” related activities, the shift through the 1960’s to avoiding investment in war
related activities, the 1980’s in respect of screening for investment in the then repressive regime
in South Africa to modern day screening which primarily screens for tobacco.237 Knoll suggests
that whether or not ethical screening has a direct impact on targeted firms in terms of investors
improving society by disciplining unethical corporations depends on the steepness of the demand
curve for the corporation’s securities. He argues that there is a lack of empirical evidence that it
has a substantial impact on targeted firms’ stock price and thus on their activities.238
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According to the Social Investment Forum, as of 2001, 96% of all screened assets screened for
tobacco, whereas less than 50% screen for human rights or labour standards.239 This indicates
that there are different conceptions of what it means to socially screen. Investors may or may not
be aware of the scope of the screens that their funds utilize. While a screen may be avoiding
investment in one type of activity, it may be directing additional investment dollars to firms that
engage in repressive labour or human rights practices. Since many of the social screening
agencies sell the screening as a commodity, there is little transparency in the scope of the
screening and in the weights given to particular corporate conduct.240

There are also challenges unique to South Africa as an emerging economy. The African Institute
of Corporate Citizenship has reported that many investors were “burned by the empowerment
crash” of the late 1990’s and are now reluctant to invest in empowerment equity.241 It notes that
the Black Empowerment Commission is advocating 10% of all assets under management,
including those of government employees, be allocated towards areas of national priority via
SRIs.242 The Institute argues that if enacted, this will have serious implications for SRI in South
Africa because many funds are opposed to prescriptive allocation of assets.243

Instead, it

recommends the approach of pension fund regulation, which requires trustees to disclose the
extent to which, if any, social, environmental, ethical and in some cases labour issues are
considered in making investment decisions.

Its view is that disclosure will be the driver in

changing investment practices to more socially responsible behaviour. The Institute suggests
that in order for South Africa’s SRI sector to advance, the term SRI needs to be defined in the
South African context, and that the definition of empowerment needs a broader interpretation.244
Standards and benchmarks in addition to the SRI index must be developed to provide the
industry with measurable criteria with which to assess the merits of a particular investment and to
measure its success in society. It argues that the merits of prescribed asset allocation versus
disclosure must be debated. The Institute also recommends that the financial sector needs to
start integrating the concepts of corporate governance, corporate citizenship and sustainability
into its thinking and actions. Even with the limitations of the potential effectiveness of SRIs, it
may prove an important vehicle to increase the funds flowing into SRIs, given the importance of
South Africa’s transformation agenda.
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Conclusion

South Africa, along with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa faces daunting economic and social
challenges over the next decades. However, it does have some advantages over its neighbors in
having a much more active capital market, and tradition of corporate governance regulation
(greatly distorted by apartheid and its economic and social inheritance). While internal initiatives
such as the King Reports, the JSE initiatives and the proposed new corporation law provide the
necessary evidence of the vast reservoir of willingness to progress in corporate governance in
South Africa, it cannot progress on its own.

Unless some international support is provided

through debt reform, an international forum for control of MNEs’ harmful activities, and support for
other Sub-Saharan African countries’ development of capital markets and corporate governance
initiatives, South Africa may drown in a race to the regulatory and economic bottom by shortsighted investors and corporate managers.

There are unlimited areas for further research, including: investigation into the recent suits for
environmental harm under the Constitution and environmental laws and the impact of these suits
both in terms of investor chill and in remediating the environment; study of reporting on HIV/AIDs
in companies, including whether companies are reporting affirmative measures and whether there
is any means to measure impact of such reporting; exploration of new ways to legislatively draw
aside the corporate veil and give host nations access to assets of parent MNEs where there is
corporate malfeasance or corporate harm from the activities of the MNE in the host nation; and
further research on African value systems and their normative upside potential for developing an
effective domestic corporate governance regime. There should also be further consideration of
the proposal that a percentage of assets under management be directed to black empowerment
and other remedial measures that would serve to rebalance the system before economic, social
and environmental self-sustainability is possible.
This paper has explored more challenges than solutions, although it is meant to continue the
conversation internationally about optimal governance systems grounded in the political, social
and economic context in which corporations operate. The key question is whether governance
initiatives will have any demonstrable impact on the problems highlighted here.

